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ith the eurozone still hovering on the brink of disaster and member states slashing 
their defence budgets, it is no surprise that the EU is struggling to revamp itself as 
a global security actor. These are the times when peacekeepers are being sidelined 
by stock brokers, and strategic doctrines overshadowed by bail-out plans. Yet the tectonic 
plates of global security are shifting. What is certain, however, is the demand for security 
throughout Europe’s ‘homeland’, as indeed in its neighbourhood to the east and the south, 
and farther afield.   
The heart of the problem resides in the supply side of European security. In the ten years of 
operational existence of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), the EU has grown 
into a global crisis manager and has strengthened its role as a regional security actor, by 
serving as a partner for the United Nations. However, since the launching of EUNAVFOR 
Atalanta off the coast of the Horn of Africa in December 2008, the CSDP, acting as the ‘hard’ 
power projection arm of the EU, seems to have lost much of its force de frappe. Military and 
civilian capacity-building lags behind as operational requirements become more demanding: 
existing  capabilities  are  neither  smart,  nor  shared  widely  enough.  Furthermore,  on  the 
operational side, 28 crisis management missions have been launched since 2003, but only one 
– the small-scale EU Training Mission in Somalia – since Operation Atalanta. EUFOR Libya, 
the EU’s operation to support humanitarian assistance announced on 1 April 2011, was never 
launched, let alone a full-scale military intervention under the CSDP. The dust kicked-up by 
the Lisbon Treaty’s institutional innovations in the realm of EU external action has needed 
time to settle. The European External Action Service (EEAS) is still trying to find ways and 
means  to properly  incorporate  the military  and  civil-military  bodies  into  its  bureaucratic 
structures. In other words, in the operational sense – the raison d’être of the CSDP – the EU’s 
security persona has been dormant for the past couple of years. 
A lack of political will and low commitment on the part of the member states to provide the 
EU institutions with coherent strategic guidelines and operational punch have been regarded 
as  the  core  problems.  In  the  words  of  Jolyon  Howorth,  the  British  scholar  of  European 
politics and military policy, the CSDP is suffering from an “existential crisis”: a debate about 
its ambitions and objectives – that is, a radical review of the European Security Strategy, 
adopted in 2003 – is urgently needed. Leadership in implementation (or the lack thereof) also 
matters.  
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Recently, however, there have been two signs of revival. The first is the debate on pooling 
and sharing of military capabilities, sparked by the Ghent initiative in the autumn of 2010 
and boosted by the NATO smart defence agenda endorsed at the Chicago summit in May. 
The recent CEPS Commentary “EU Defence Policy after Chicago: Going Smart?” traced this 
development.  The  second  sign,  and  the  subject  of  this  Commentary,  is  a  renewed 
engagement  in  crisis  management,  in  the  form  of  the  launch  of  new  missions  and  the 
extension  of  existing  ones.  Speaking  at  the  European  Parliament  on  13  December  2011, 
HR/VP Catherine Ashton stressed that the EU needs to assume its global responsibilities 
whilst showing real value for money, highlighting the need for CSDP action to be “based on 
coherent and effective strategies” and for the EEAS to turn “comprehensive approach into 
comprehensive action”. The question arises as to whether the EU re-engagement in crisis 
management is enough to wake up the security persona of the EU on the world stage.     
Following technical assessments, planning and recruitment undertaken in the first semester 
of 2012, three new civilian CSDP missions (see table, p. 3) are expected to be launched by the 
end of the summer:  
1.  EUCAP NESTOR – Regional Maritime Capacity Building (RMCB) for the Horn of Africa 
and the Western Indian Ocean. This civilian mission, enhanced with military expertise, 
aims at strengthening the maritime capacities of eight countries in the region, in support 
of the two ongoing operations in the Horn of Africa, EUNAVFOR Atalanta and EUTM 
Somalia. In the “Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa”, adopted by the Council on 
14 November 2011, the mission has been designed to prevent and deter pirates from 
interrupting global maritime trade and enable regional states, through the build-up of 
maritime capacity, to control their territorial seas and exclusive economic zones through 
effective maritime governance, and take ownership of the fight against piracy.  
2.  EUAVSEC South Sudan – Airport Security Strengthening Mission, Juba International 
Airport  (South  Sudan).  The  purpose  of  this  small-scale  mission  is  to  support  the 
establishment  of  a  National  Civil  Aviation  Security  Committee  and  the  related 
development  of  civil  aviation  security  programmes  to  improve  security  at  the  Juba 
International  Airport  to  enable  new  passenger and  commercial  routes  and  boost  the 
South Sudanese economy.  
3.  EUSEC Niger –To be deployed in Niger in the framework of the “Strategy for Security 
and Development in the Sahel” (published by the EEAS on 23 March 2012), this mission 
aims  to  support  police  reform  and  law  enforcement  capacities  and  increase 
interoperability to fight terrorism and organized crime.     
In addition to this renewed activity, the EU has prolonged the mandate of three of its major 
ongoing missions. On March 23rd, the Council decided to extend the mandate and area of 
operation  of  the  EUNAVFOR  Atalanta  until  December  2014.  The  extension  includes  the 
Somali coastal territory as well as internal waters: it allows strikes against pirate onshore 
infrastructures  up  to  a  limit  of  2,000  metres  inland  (with  some  caveats,  such  as  the 
prohibition to use missiles and deploy ground troops), a mandate which has already been 
used.  Following  a  Council  decision  on  June  5th,  the  EU’s  rule  of  law  mission  in  Kosovo 
(EULEX), currently the largest civilian crisis management mission, has been prolonged by 
two more years, until June 2014, with a €111 million budget allocated for the first year. The 
mission, currently the largest civilian deployment, has also been reconfigured so as to entail 
a significant (circa 25%) staff reduction. Finally, the rule of law mission in Iraq (EUJUST Lex), 
launched in July 2005, was extended until December 2013. Conversely, the longest-running 
CSDP mission to date, EU Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia and Herzegovina, was closed on 
30 June 2012.  THE EU’S RE-ENGAGEMENT AS A SECURITY ACTOR | 3 
 
Overview of the new CSDP missions  
Mission  Initial 
mandate  
Budget 
(€ mil) 
Mission 
strength 
Expected 
deployment  Activities 
EUCAP 
Nestor  2 years  22.8   200+ 
August/Sep
t 2012 
Strengthen the seagoing maritime capacity 
of Djibouti, Kenya, Tanzania and the 
Seychelles 
Strengthen the rule of law sector in Somalia 
by training and protecting judges. Train, 
equip and support the set-up of a coastal 
police force in the regions of Puntland and 
Somaliland 
EUAVSEC 
South 
Sudan 
19 
months 
12.5   64 
September 
2012 
Training, supervision and mentoring of 
private and public entities on security 
awareness  
Provision of technical equipment to 
strengthen aviation security capabilities   
EUSEC 
Niger  N/A  N/A  N/A 
September 
2012 
Capacity-building civilian mission with a 
focus on the reform of the police forces and 
the training of prosecutors/judges to 
enhance law enforcement capacities  
Sources:  For  EUCAP  Nestor  and  EUAVSEC  South  Sudan:  Interviews  with  EEAS  officials,  COUNCIL 
DECISION  2012/312/CFSP  on  South  Sudan  (12  June  2006),  EEAS  factsheet 
(http://www.consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defence/eu-operations?lang=nl).  For  EUSEC 
Niger: B2 (www.bruxelles2.eu).  
 
Has CSDP finally woken up?  
At first sight, it looks like the EU has woken up from its CSDP power nap. Yet, the new 
operational impetus offers a reality check on EU security policy. On the one hand, the EU 
will face the unprecedented situation of simultaneously operating 15 missions (12 existing 
ones plus the 3 in the pipeline). On the other hand, the high-risk operational theatres will test 
the comprehensive approach and the focus on civil-military cooperation and coordination. 
Such an integrated approach to EU external action writ large is demanded by the Lisbon 
Treaty and thus also constitutes the strategic blueprint of the CSDP. The fight against piracy 
in  the  Horn  of  Africa/West  Indian  Ocean  is  a  case  in  point,  with  the  interlinks  and 
complementarities between EUNAVFOR, EUTM and EUCAP. EUSEC Niger will constitute 
the first concrete step in the broader regional strategy for the Sahel, where insecurity has 
soared as a result of the degenerating crisis in northern Mali. It potentially paves the way for 
a  long-term  engagement  drawing  on  a  wide  range  of  EU  external  action  instruments. 
Political resolve to engage in post-conflict Libya beyond border management, for instance 
through security sector  reform  (SSR)  and  disarmament,  demobilization  and  reintegration 
(DDR), would compensate for previous inaction (cf. the April fools’ joke of EUFOR Libya). 
Nevertheless, political sensitivities within member states and the deepening instability and 
chaos in the country are major factors inhibiting a decision.    
Political resolve among member states is precisely the heart of the matter. Apart from that, 
CSDP  needs  important  operational  deliverables  if  the  EU  is  to  somehow  rehabilitate  its 
reputation as a security actor. The newly created institutional structures (e.g. the EEAS) and 
procedures  (e.g.  early  warning  capacity)  could  benefit  tremendously  from  a  new  set  of 
learning experiences, and so could interoperability on the ground. With only 10 years of 4 | FALEG & BLOCKMANS 
 
operational experience in the field of CSDP,– it should be acknowledged that the EU is still a 
young security institution compared to, for example, NATO, the UN or the OSCE. Therefore, 
learning  by  doing  remains  a  crucial  element  of  policy  evolution.  The  post-Lisbon 
institutional format has not yet been tested on that front.   
Yet  the  new  CSDP  missions  do  not  seem  to  offer  a  steep  curve  for  such  learning 
requirements. Their scale is too narrow, their scope and mandate too limited for the EU to re-
assume a global security role. The integrated approach foreseen by the Lisbon Treaty and 
crafted by the EEAS is a step in the right direction but must be beefed up by more substantial 
operational deployments. This, in turn, heavily depends upon political will and strategic 
underpinning. Like the build-up of military capabilities through pooling and sharing, crisis 
management missions need to be backed by a shared ‘rationale’ justifying common – and 
comprehensive – actions. The formulation of a new European Security Strategy that takes 
account of the new elements of the EU’s integrated civil-military crisis management as well 
as the profound changes in the global security environment can no longer be postponed if 
the  EU  no  longer  wants  to  be  seen  sleepwalking  through  today’s  changing  geostrategic 
landscape.  